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OPPOSITION CANDIDACY AND ELECTORAL POLITICS IN TANZANIA: THE CASE OF ZITTO ZUBERI KABWE

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Abstract

In an electoral environment where the playing field is highly contested, it is pertinent to learn how opposition candidates win elections. This narrative case study draws from observation of parliamentary elections in Kigoma North and Kigoma Urban constituencies in Tanzania to demonstrate how the opposition candidate maneuvered to outcompete candidates of the ruling party. It reveals that winning elections involves preparations for real or perceived electoral fraud. The paper uncovers practical strategies that opposition candidates' in Tanzania use to counter election fraud and the challenges they are likely to face. These findings reinforce existing research on electoral integrity.

Keywords

Election integrity, election fraud, opposition candidacy, Zitto Kabwe, Tanzania

1   Introduction

Election fraud continues to be a trying challenge in many countries including established democracies (Alvarez, Hal and Hyde, 2009). In an electoral environment where the political playing field is highly contested, it is even more pertinent to learn how opposition candidates organise to win elections. Existing research on electoral integrity has dealt with how elections are rigged, and possible measures have been suggested (Sutter, 2003; Calingaert, 2006; Beaulieu and Hyde, 2009; Cheeseman and Klaas, 2018). Most of this

research has paid much attention to national or presidential elections as opposed to legislative elections. Common electoral fraud tactics reported by existing research include voter buying, gerrymandering, ballot box stuffing, hacking election infrastructure; manipulation of the voter register, falsified vote tabulation, intimidation and political repression. Similarly, conventional mitigation measures have been proposed including strengthening integrity and independence of electoral institutions, strengthening election regulations and enforcement, cyber-security, independent election monitoring, political party polling agents, parallel vote tabulations and voter education. Notwithstanding, there is little knowledge of what candidates and parties in legislative elections in Africa essentially do to get more out of these mitigation strategies.

Africa has probably higher levels of electoral fraud than elsewhere in the world. Recent researches indicate that despite the three decades of democratisation, it is increasingly becoming difficult for opposition parties in Africa to win elections and more difficult to unseat incumbent presidents (Bleck and van de Walle, 2018). New developments point to what Lührmann and Lindberg (2019) have termed, "a third wave of autocratization". Vote-buying, violence, corruption, election rigging and ethnic voting are common practices in Africa electoral politics (Adejumobi, 2000; Adebanwi and Obadare, 2011; Lynch and Crawford, 2011; Jensen and Justesen, 2014; Moore, 2014; Orji, 2014; Long and Gibson, 2015; Patel and Wahman, 2015).

Fighting electoral fraud continues to be a challenging undertaking in emerging democracies. This is even more challenging in Africa because, the competency, impartiality and honesty of Election Management Bodies (EMBs) continue to be a matter of concern in many countries (Gibb, 2016; Makulilo *et al.*, 2016). As a result, the integrity of elections is highly questionable compared to other continents (Norris, Frank and Martínez, 2014). Studies show that biased and incompetent EMBs are unlikely to deliver credible outcomes (Boyko and Herron, 2015). Likewise, election results in many African countries have been contested by the losing side, mostly the opposition. Tanzania is not an exception (Paget 2021; Killian, 2009; Makulilo, 2009). Similarly, political neutrality of state security organs in Africa is also in question. In Uganda and Nigeria, for instance, state apparatus have been accused of furthering the interest of the ruling party (Makara, 2010; Onapajo, 2014). Despite the

challenging political and electoral environment, opposition parties still manage to obtain some seats in legislatures.

Elections in Tanzania are conducted in a contested electoral environment apparently with limited chances for opposition candidates to lose on fairgrounds. Notwithstanding, Zitto Zuberi Kabwe is among rare opposition parliamentary candidates that have won the seat in three consecutive terms and, in two different constituencies. He won a parliamentary seat in Kigoma North consecutively in 2005 &2010 and one term in Kigoma Urban in the 2015 elections.

Election reports tend to reveal more about who won or lost the election in particular setting but very little about the processes that produce such election outcomes. This is also the case with country level local and international election observation reports. This study draws from the author's field experience of observing elections at the constituency level as well as constituency election observers' reports to bridge that gap. It addresses this important question: what it takes for the opposition candidate to win a parliamentary election in Tanzania and how? To that an endeavour, it draws from the 2010 parliamentary election in Kigoma North to show how the opposition candidate organized his campaigns to win the election. Second, it draws from the 2010 (Kigoma North) and 2015 & 2020 elections in Kigoma Urban constituency to uncover the strategies used by the opposition candidate to fight election fraud. Finally, it explains why the strategies that worked well in previous elections, they did not work in the 2020 elections. While its findings may not be generalizable, being one of the limitations of case study methodology, it draws valuable lessons on how opposition candidates crossover unlevelled playing field into victory and the constraints thereof. It is findings are therefore useful for both aspiring candidates and democratic reformers and the public at large.

The rest of the paper is organised as follows. The next part covers background of politics in Kigoma Urban and Kigoma North. This is followed by the methodology of the study. The next section covers extensively the 2010 elections in Kigoma North with particular interests in showing how the opposition candidate organised to win the election and prevented election fraud. After that, the 2015 and 2020 elections are discussed. It concludes by highlighting key implications and suggesting area for future research.

2   The political background

Tanzania reopened its political space in 1992 and went into the first general election three years later in 1995. Since then, six multiparty general elections have been conducted after every five years election cycle. The country practices a single-member constituency under the first past the post electoral system.

Tanzania has had competitive parliamentary elections even during the single-party period (1965-1990). Competition in the single-party elections was between two candidates of the same party, TANU and after 1977, Chama cha Mapinduzi (CCM). For instance, in 1970, over one-third of the former MPs who contested lost the election (Hyden and Leys, 1972). Analysing the single-party parliamentary elections in Tanzania, van Donge and Liviga (1989) asserted that "Few Tanzanian MPs serve more than one term and, if they seek re-election, they often fail". For instance, only eleven of the MPs who won in the 1985 elections had served more than one term in parliament (ibid). In the 1990 election, 20 percent of incumbent MPs were defeated (Luanda, 1994). It was, therefore, expected that with the introduction of multiparty politics many opposition MPs would be elected into the parliament. Contrary to that expectation, Table 1 shows that the electoral support for the opposition parties has kept declining and almost despaired in the 2020 elections.

Election	CCM Seats	Opposition Seats	Percent
1995	186	46	20%
2000	202	29	13%
2005	206	26	11%
2010	186	53	22%
2015	185	68	27%
2020	256	8	3%

TABLE 1: Percentage of opposition's Parliamentary Elected Seats (1995-2020)
SOURCE: EISA & INTER-PARLIAMENTARY UNION[1]

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[1]https://www.eisa.org/wep/tanelectarchive.htm
https://data.ipu.org/node/184/elections?chamber_id=13508&election_id=27983

Although more opposition candidates made it to parliament in the 2010 and 2015 elections, the general picture shows that in Tanzania, it is not easy to defeat candidates of the ruling party. While competing explanations for this have been advanced, there is a consensus among academics that the chances for opposition candidates to win elections are limited largely by unlevelled political playing field among other factors. It is therefore important to understand the strategies that opposition candidates use to maneuver the unlevelled playing field to outpass candidates of the ruling party. While opposition candidates have won in several constituencies, this study will focus on two constituencies in western Tanzania namely Kigoma Urban and Kigoma North.

Kigoma Urban and Kigoma North constituencies occupy a special space in Tanzania's electoral politics. Since the reintroduction of multiparty politics in the country, the constituencies have had highly contested elections. The first multiparty parliamentary election in Kigoma Urban was a by-election conducted in 1994, two years after the reintroduction of multiparty politics. The daily newspaper in Tanzania describes it as the "*Obviously the first major election since the re-introduction of multiparty politics in Tanzania in 1992 that had challenged CCM's hold on power, at least the Constituency level*" (*The Citizen, Sunday, March* 11, 2018)[2]. In that particular election, Dr. Amani Walid Kabourou, the opposition candidate through Chama cha Demockrasia na Maendeleo (CHADEMA) lost to CCM's candidate, Mr. Azim Premji only to successfully challenge the results in court and then defeating Mr. Premji few months later in the 1995 general elections. Likewise, the latter overturned the results of the general election in the court and won the by-election against Dr. Kabourou. In the 2000 elections, Dr. Kabourou defeated Mr. Premji but lost to Peter Serukamba, the CCM's candidate later in the 2005 elections. The constituency remained under CCM until 2015 when Peter Serukamba switched to Kigoma-North and Zitto Kabwe moved to Kigoma Urban. Parliamentary elections in Kigoma North have been competitive as well. In the 1995 and 2000 elections, the CCM candidate worn by little margin and this was because of

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[2] Preceding by-elections in other Ileje and Kwahani constituencies were easily won by CCM. See more details at https://www.thecitizen.co.tz/tanzania/news/elections-that-put-kabourou-on-tanzania-s-political-map-2626108

splits of opposition's votes (*Mwananchi News Paper, February* 18, 2015)[3]. The constituency went to the opposition in the 2005 and 2010 elections and back to CCM in the 2015 elections.

Politics in the two constituencies is also characterised by candidates decamping from one political party to another. After losing the 2005 election, Dr. Kabourou moved to CCM. He contested against Zitto Kabwe in the 2015 elections and got a terrible defeat. Mr. Robinson Fulgence Lembo, a CCM candidate who ran against Kabwe in the 2010 elections, competed through CHAUMA in the 2015 election and emerged in the fourth position. Mr Kabwe, got dismissed from CHADEMA and went on to form his own party, the Alliance for Change Tanzania-Wazalendo (ACT-Wazalendo). Decamping of candidates did not affect their former parties except one. Only Mr. Kabwe retained popularity. Table 2 shows that consecutively in three elections since 2005, Mr. Kabwe maintained an electoral margin of between 9 and 23 percent. He lost unexpectedly to the CCM candidate in the 2020 elections[4].

Candidate	2005	2010	2015	2020
	Kigoma North		*Kigoma Urban*	
Zitto Kabwe	51%	49%	51%	41%
CCM candidate	40%	39%	28%	55%
Other Candidates	10%	12%	21%	3%
Electoral Margin	9%	10%	23%	-14%

TABLE 2: Zitto Kabwe's Electoral Performance *(Percentage Vote share)*
SOURCE: RETURNING OFFICERS/NATIONAL ELECTORAL COMMISSION

Moreover, the two constituencies are the only constituencies in Tanzania mainland with consistently highest number of political parties that manage to have candidates in parliamentary and councillors' elections. For example, 14, 16 and 10 political parties respectively participated in 2010, 2015 and 2020 elections in Kigoma North. Likewise, 13, and 9 political parties

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[3] https://www.mwananchi.co.tz/mw/kolamu/mtifuano-mkubwa-majimbo-ya-kigoma-kaskazini-kusini-muhambwe-na-buyungu-2779758
[4] The dynamics of this particular election are discussed in another section.

participated in the 2015 and 2020 elections in Kigoma Urban respectively[5]. The residents, especially in Kigoma Urban, practice active politics throughout the election cycle. They have political centres where they convene for daily political discussion. Similarly, voter turnout in the two constituencies has been impressive most of the time higher than the national average.

3   Methodology

The paper uses a qualitative case study design while treating one of the opposition candidates, Zitto Zuberi Kabwe as its case. It draws evidence from long term election observation in Kigoma-North and Urban constituencies in Tanzania where this particular former MP contested and won the elections. Its author served as an election observer for the Tanzania Elections Monitoring Committee (TEMCO) in Kigoma North constituency between 16th September and 3rd November 2010. Because our case study switched the constituency from Kigoma North to Kigoma Urban and contested there in the 2015 and 2020 elections, it utilises documentary evidence of unpublished reports of other long term election observers in those elections[6].

Data was collected through observation, interview and documentary review methods. Invariably in all three elections, the long term observers attended campaign rallies, interviewed the candidates, voters, election officials, officers of political parties and polling agents. They witnessed the voting exercise, the counting and tallying of votes, announcements of election results and they observed post-election dynamics. They also recruited and

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[5] The information on the number of participating parties in 2010 elections was not accessed.

[6] In this case, long term election observation refers to observing a particular election consistently for a period not less than 30 days. TEMCO is an experienced local election observer in Tanzania since the first multiparty elections. In 2020, it was among the local observers who did not get accreditation from the National Electoral Commission but its organisation, the Research for Education and Democracy in Tanzania (REDET). The constituency level election observation reports can be accessed at REDET/TEMCO's resource centre at the University of Dar es salaam Tanzania.

placed poll watchers who reported on the voting exercises in selected polling stations. Election observation instruments used to gather data were developed by TEMCO and had been tested in previous elections and improved accordingly. Thematic analysis was applied to gain sense out of the data.

Mr. Kabwe was considered to be a perfect case of this study for several reasons. He is among the rare opposition parliamentary candidates in Tanzania that have won the seat for three consecutive terms, in two different constituencies. He is an influential politician in the country who inspired many youths to join opposition politics. At the age of 29, he came from college, contested and defeated the outgoing CCM MP in Kigoma North by getting 51% of votes against 40%. He was re-elected to the Parliament in 2010. Almost seven months before the 2015 elections, he was dismissed from his former political party, CHADEMA and went on to form his own. He switched to the neighbouring constituency and won the election with a landslide. Mr. Kabwe is among the few opposition MPs who remained critical of the late President Magufuli's regime while others either defected to CCM or chose a low profile. Learning how this particular candidate has been organising to win election, uncovering strategies he employed to counter election fraud and, the challenges faced in the 2020 elections would draw valuable lessons not only to opposition candidates but also to academics and democratic reformers.

4   The 2010 Elections in Kigoma North

The 2010 election in Kigoma North was hot because Mr. Kabwe, as an outgoing MP, was competing against other two powerful candidates from the major parties. These were Robinson Fulgence Lembo-CCM and Omary Mussa Nkwarulo of the Civic United Front (CUF). In terms of financial resources and campaign materials, all three were well equipped. Officially declared election expenses by each of these candidates was within the legal limit of Tanzania shilling (TZS.) 50,000,000 (USD 22,421) though one of them confessed to having spent over 60 million (USD 26,000). Unlike the seven candidates of other parties, arrivals at campaign rallies for these candidates could easily be marked by a convoy of at least expensive three Four-Wheeled Drive vehicles. Members of their campaign teams were remunerated with allowances something which kept their commitment high. Seven other candidates from

small political parties participated in the election[7]. Those candidates were poorly resourced to the extent that none of them managed to even conduct five campaign rallies. Their means of transport to campaign rallies were either foot or in rare cases, hired motorcycles. Even many of the rallies they held were in candidates' neighbourhoods or neighbouring villages.

The CVs of Mr. Kabwe's competitors were pretty good. Mr. Lembo had served as a former senior government bureaucrat whose experience in the public service amounted to 30 years. He seemed to be a gentleman relatively old compared to other candidates but less eloquent. In terms of education, his CV indicated that he had a master degree in business administration and was a Certified Public Accountant. Although it was during three years before the election when Mr. Lembo started to pay a visit to the constituency, the participatory model that CCM adopted in intra-party primaries leveraged him to become known by CCM members in every village. Besides, he had two Toyota V8 land cruisers, well-branded in green and yellow CCM colours and magnificent pictures of both him and the CCM presidential candidate. These made him prominent even before the official opening of election campaigns. He became a CCM flag bearer after getting 5,548 delegate votes in intra-CCM primaries far beyond his closest contestants. Mr. Nkwarulo, famously nicknamed "*Dunia*" was a big businessman in Dar-es-salaam. He became a CUF frag bearer after defecting from CCM where he had emerged in the second position in the primaries after getting 3,319 of the delegate votes. Unlike other candidates, many voters knew and viewed him as a rich man. Having been the first person to build a private secondary school and a Teacher Training College in the constituency, Mr. Nkwarulo was not only famous but also a respected man. Before defecting to CUF, he was the CCM's district youth commander. Notwithstanding, his academic credentials were highly questionable. His CV indicated that he had his first degree in business administration and was pursuing his masters at the University of Dar-es-salaam. One of the embarrassing moments for him happened when a group of the youth demanded that he speaks English as a proof of his academic credentials. The incident happened on 16th October 2020 during the campaign rally at Mwandiga football ground. Nevertheless, he was good at self-expression and had high convincing power. That could be observed through

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[7] These were CHAUSTA, APPT-Maendeleo, DP, SAU, NRA, Jahazi Asilia and UMD.

his speeches and selling of the "*Nipe Nikupe* coupon" at TZS 500 on the promise that whoever bought it would be the first beneficiary of his reign[8]. He also managed to convince Ms. Sijapata Nkayamba who was an outgoing CCM's women special seats MP to leave CCM and join him in CUF. Ms. Nkayamba had got the third position in CCM primaries by 2,948 delegates' votes. Her presence in Mr. Nkwarulo's camp boosted his campaigns both in terms of resources and votes.

There was no doubt that if the elections were free and fair, Mr. Kabwe would emerge a winner. Both his personality and performance in the first tenure priced him well. He was a young outgoing MP seeking re-election for the second term. At the time of the election, he could be described as one of the most influential and critical politicians in the country. He had made himself a prominent figure through active participation in the 2005/10 parliamentary debates. Quoting findings of a study conducted by a local Non-Government Organization, the weekly newspaper, *Raia Mwema of February 10-16, 2010* reported that from 2005 to December 2009 Zitto Kabwe asked 24 primary and 47 supplementary questions and made 128 contributions in the Parliament. Concerning the ability of self-expression, he could be qualified as an eloquent speaker. He was also well educated. He had a first degree in economics and another in international marketing. Some of the citizens who were interviewed mentioned Mr. Kabwe's ability to challenge the government as one of the reasons they would vote for him. One of the citizens in Kalinzi Village expressed to never had interest in following-up parliamentary sessions until one day when he heard Mr. Kabwe speaking in the House. "*Since then, I never miss to follow-up [parliamentary sessions]. The boy [Kabwe] knows how to speak, hey! Even misters fear him*"[9], he insisted. A study on voter behaviour in Tanzania had also found that 90% of respondents ranked the ability for self-expression number one of the candidate's characteristics they would consider when electing a leader (Maliyamkono, 1995). Before the 2010 elections, Mr. Kabwe had just occupied a novel space in

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[8] The candidate had printed thousands of coupons bearing party symbols, campaign promises and "Nipe Nikupe" as the main message. The candidate was selling these coupons at a rate of TZS. 500/=. Probably, that was a strategy to raise campaign funds.

[9] Interview, Citizen at Kalinzi Village, 1/10/2010.

anti-corruption crusades in the country. A blocked attempt of him to table a Private Motion on a dubious mining contract between the Government and Barrick Gold Mine had not only made him a hero but also a victim of vested interest[10]. It was anticipated that vested interests would do anything to block his re-election. However, Mr. Kabwe was an experienced politician who knew well how to play national and local politics including manipulating the voters. At the time of the election, he was a top senior official in CHADEMA, had been a chairperson of the parliamentary standing committee responsible for public corporations accounts and served in various positions as a shadow minister, among others.

Apart from personality factors, Mr. Kabwe had other comparative advantages. In a year preceding the election, the government constructed a 60km tarmac road from Mwandiga to Manyovu truncating across 6 of the 11 wards of the constituency. Conversations with the residents revealed that before the road was built, a less than 60km distance from the northern ward, Mkigo to Kigoma urban used to take between 12 and 16 hours of uncertain journey. Citizens paid between 8 to12 thousand shillings (around 3-5 USD) for a trip depending on whether it was a dry or rainy season. The construction of the road reduced the fare to TZS 5,000 (2 USD) and cut travel time to less than 2 hours of assured journey. Given the poor economic conditions of the residents in Kigoma North, no wonder the road was a trump card. Other issues that were attributed to his performance include providing sponsorship to 312 needy students for secondary education and the construction of a port at Kagunga (in Lake Tanganyika). Others were surveying and planning of 27 out of 32 villages; distribution of mattresses to women wards in the health centre; construction of market centres in some areas and restoring the dignity

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[10] On August 2007 Mr. Kabwe tabled a Private Motion asking the House to form a Special Committee to investigate the said contract. Using CCM dominance in the House, the motion was rejected instead the mover was suspended for allegations of cheating the House. His suspension became not only an opportunity for his party to mobilize the public against the government but also on the eyes of majority Tanzanians Mr. Kabwe became a hero.

of the people of Kigoma[11]. Mr. Kabwe's election campaigns capitalised very much on these achievements.

4.1   Organising for Election

Winning elections requires good organisation among others. A candidate has to reach as many voters as possible to sell his/her promises. He/she needs to have a clear understanding of the constituency geography and voter behaviour. He/she also need to know the strengths, weaknesses opportunities and challenges of both him/her and competitors. The interaction between Mr. Kabwe and the electorate was carried out through five modalities: open-air campaign rallies, indoor meetings, house to house canvassing, print materials such as posters and flyers and the inauguration of grassroots party cells. Candidate's posters, flyers and party flags were abundantly all over the constituency. Campaign messages and issues were in two forms, those promoting him and those discrediting the opponents.

Mr. Kabwe employed various strategies to have his campaign messages reach as many people as possible. First, he laid down a constituency and grassroots level campaign structure. At the constituency level, there was a core team that comprised of five persons, including a campaign manager, a propagandist, and three other persons, one of these was an outgoing women special seats MP for CHADEMA. That was the candidate's accompanying team. The main task of the campaign manager was to organise and coordinate campaigns, including managing the campaign timetable, coordinating the supporting team and paying allowances for team members. He was also responsible for liaising with the Returning Officer (RO) and working with the candidate to develop campaign messages and propaganda. Since he was a professional medical doctor, he was also taking care of the health of the candidate. The role of the outgoing women MP was to solicit for women's votes. The second group had about six people, primarily vigilant youth. It played a variety of functions including security, advertising

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[11]The colonial administrations designated Kigoma as one of the sources of supplying manual labour to colonial plantations. Due to such historical factors Kigoma was highly underdeveloped and there was some kind of negative stereotypes to people from such regions.

rallies by using a loud public address system, and mobilising the youth to thwart voter buying.

Since the constituency was relatively bigger in size, Mr. Kabwe clustered it into three geographical zones. Three persons in each zone were tasked to work closely with the councillor candidates and to conduct daily campaigns for both him and councillor candidates. They were also responsible for organising and implementing house to house campaigns in their respective zones. These were well coordinated and were reporting to the campaign manager daily. Apart from this group, there were other ten people in the vicinity of every polling station. These included four women, three older men and three youth whose task was to move around and convince their peers to vote for the candidate. Mr. Kabwe explained that these were volunteers[12]. Zoning made it easier for the candidate to sustain campaign activities in a large constituency throughout the campaign period.

Second, Mr. Kabwe had a pre-recorded own-voice clip summarising the achievements of his first term as a representative and the promises for the next five years. The audio clip would be played in a loud public address system around neighbourhoods where the campaign rally was to be held in the following day. Zonal campaign coordinators informed the party village leaders about the coming of Mr. Kabwe who in turn mobilised residents to attend the rally. Zonal campaign coordinators were also responsible to organize spies who attended the rallies of other candidates to report back what had transpired. Their main task was to assess other candidates' campaign rallies. Every moment when Mr. Kabwe arrived at a certain village for a campaign rally, he first conducted indoor meetings with influential senior men and women in that particular locality. These had been gathered by the group of 10 "volunteers". Informants reported that such meetings were meant to meet with influential CCM supporters and leaders at the grassroots to de-align them from CCM. Probably, the indoor discussions were supposedly organised to cool down the temper of angry but also hungry elders! Arrivals at campaign rallies were always coloured by the famous scene of 20 to 30 *bodaboda* (motorcyclists) who fronted the convoy while demonstrating their cycling skills. The adverting vehicle would be playing party songs while

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[12] Interview, 22/10/2010.

promotional groups and fans busy dancing at the campaign ground to hold on people while the candidate finishes some other businesses.

Mr. Kabwe's campaigns were based on three main assumptions. When asked why he thought was going to be re-elected, he first mentioned his past five year's track record. He firmly believed that his past five years in the Parliament created hope to the voters, and whenever he talked about his five years achievements, the majority understood him. The second was based on assessment of his closest competitor, Mr. Lembo. He said that usually the people of Kigoma appreciated someone who is eloquent and his close competitor did not seem to have such quality. Bad enough Mr. Lembo had done nothing for the electorate. The third was based on a fair assessment of the self. He knew his major weakness was spending little time in the constituency during the first term and many voters had a lot of discontent on that[13]. Likewise, his campaigns capitalised on previous achievements (track records), a proactive apology to voters for his long absence while promising to rectify past mistakes. While Mr. Kabwe personally distanced himself from negative campaigns, his propaganda machine usually throw devastating remarks against CCM and CUF candidates.

4.2   Campaign Issues and Promises

Mr. Kabwe's campaign promises were not based on the manifesto of his party but on future government plans. While campaigning for his party's presidential candidate was tangential and sporadic, he distanced himself from making open remarks about CCM's presidential candidate, Hon. Jakaya Kikwete. Probably he might have learnt that campaigning against Hon. Kikwete was not a good strategy given the fact that the majority of the voters regarded Hon. Kikwete as their messiah[14]. His major campaign promise was rural electrification where he promised to make sure many villages are connected

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[13] Ibid.

[14] Although the constituency's electoral support for Hon. Kikwete in the 2010 elections declined by 22% compared to 2005, he still got 30,370 votes compared to 14,783 of his close competitor, Dr. Willbrod Slaa. The widely held perception in the constituency was that Hon. Kikwete was the first President who showed to care about the people of Kigoma.

with electricity before 2015. When the author sought voters' opinions about the capacity of Mr. Kabwe to deliver such promise, many did not seem to doubt referring to the famous Mwandiga-Manyovu road. While both Mr. Kabwe and the CCM candidate had the opportunity to base their campaigns on the completed or on-going government projects, Mr. Kabwe managed to outpass CCM in attributing whatever development prospects to personal initiative. An exciting exchange during campaign rallies was on who built the Mwandinga-Manyovu road, an apparent trump card in 2010 election as summarised below:

> **Mr. Kabwe**: I have built the tarmac road. **CCM**: Zitto is lying about building the tarmac road, the road has been built by the CCM government... does CHADEMA has the government? **Public**: No, it doesn't. **CCM**: Where then did Zitto get the money to build the road? **Public**: Ask him and/we are also surprised! **CCM**: The evaluation of the project was done in 2003 before Zitto became the Member of Parliament... **Mr. Kabwe**: If CCM is claiming to have built the road, ask them why didn't they put it in their 2005 Election Manifesto, didn't I promise that if elected I was going to ensure this road is built? **Public**: Yes, you did. **Mr. Kabwe**: Has the road been built or not? **Public**: It is built. **Mr. Kabwe**: This constituency was represented by CCM MPs since independence, ask them, did they wait for Zitto to be a Member of Parliament so that they can build the road in Kigoma-North? **Public**: [Applauding Voices][15].

By Mr. Kabwe making the voters to believe that he was behind whatever development prospects in the constituency added to his advantage at the expense of Mr. Lembo. This is because public goods provision or new investments, especially in a year preceding election have been found to

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[15] Almost at every campaign rally that I attended, the Manyovu-Mwandiga road was a big issue. Each side tried to pull to its side proving to the voters that it deserved to take all the credit. This extract was not a face to face exchange between Mr. Kabwe and Mr. Lembo's team. It combines quotations captured at different campaign rallies of Mr. Kabwe and that of Mr. Lembo and in different places between September and November 2010. Almost same words were repeated at every campaign rally attended.

influence voter choices (Hausken and Ncube, 2014). Other studies have revealed that African voters do engage in economic voting as well (Bratton, Bhavnani and Chen, 2012; Zeydanli,2017). The fact that CCM and its parliamentary candidate failed to convince the voters disadvantaged its candidate from benefiting the economic votes.

In shrinking the electoral support of his close competitor, Mr. Kabwe advanced attacks both on the CV and the track record. At the campaign rallies, he would ask the voters to reject Mr. Lembo on the basis that "*he abandoned the people of Kigoma for 30 years and his return was only meant to find a place to attach himself after his retirement[16]*". He would also tell the voters to ask Mr. Lembo what were the benefits of his 30 years of government service and the experience of him touring 36 countries to the people of Kigoma North[17]. In addition, Mr. Kabwe's propaganda people would tell the voters not to elect someone who cannot express himself because such a person cannot present their concerns. Sometimes his team would borrow from Mr. Nkwarulo's words referring to Mr. Lembo as a "dumb" [*sic*]. This disparaging language was so widespread that in several cases before Mr. Lembo's campaign manager welcomed him to the stage, made this defensive remark: "*They [CHADEMA/CUF] are saying that the CCM Candidate, Mr. Lembo, is dumb! I am now inviting him to take the stage so that you may hear by your ears that he is not*"[18]. Mr. Lembo was capitalising very much on his 30 years' experience in senior positions as a faithful civil servant, his academic credentials as the most educated candidate and, the experience of touring 36 countries in the world. He had no constituency-based campaign promise. Instead, always said, "*I promise to implement CCM manifesto. CCM manifesto is roads, is water, is schools, hospital and so many other good things*"[19]. Unfortunately, the manifesto was too general and he did little to contextualise it. He also faced challenging questions from the voters, probably planted by Mr. Kabwe's team.

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[16] Campaign Rally at Mwamgongo village, 23/10/2010. Mr. Kabwe had made similar remarks at other rallies

[17] During the campaigns Mr. Lembo capitalized much on his experience of touring 36 countries and serving in government for 30 years.

[18] CCM Campaign Rallies at Chankele and Kibingo Villages 28th September 6th October 2010 respectively

[19] This remark kept recurring in every campaign rally that I attended.

For instance, during the campaign rally at Chankele village, a citizen by the name Msafiri Mrisho Mpambije asked:

> You have said that you have worked for 30 years without any reprimand from your employer, who was the government. It seems to me that you are obedient to the government. Don't you see that if elected, you will continue to obey the government and thus fear to represent our concerns?[20]

Mr. Lembo responded well that a good employee is the one who obeys his employer and for that matter, his new employer will not be the government but the people of Kigoma-North. Although his response was pretty good, it was not accompanied by applauding voices suggesting that the response did not satisfy the majority of the attendees at that rally.

Likewise, Mr. Kabwe's propagandist team attacked Mr. Nkwarulo as a conman and referred to his selling of the *Nipe Nikupe* coupons as theft to the poor citizens. Mr. Nkwarulo always portrayed himself as a successful and satisfied businessman. He promised to improve housing conditions by iron-roofing all the grass-roofed houses in the constituency. He would tell the voters that his electoral motive was not to add to his already bourgeoning wealth but to serve the people of Kigoma North and if elected, would spend all of his parliamentary salary and allowances to implement the house improvement project! However, in an interview with the author, he revealed this truth: "*I want to expand my business network because the Parliament is a place where all big businessmen in this country are sitting...*[21]" Both CUF and CCM had similar retaliations against Mr. Kabwe. They referred to him as a bachelor and a vagrant in his party. They attacked CHADEMA as an ethnic party and a SACCOS (savings credit and cooperative society) established by the northern people to drain national resources and Mr. Kabwe as an alien person advancing the interests of the *Chagga* instead of his tribe, the *Ha*[22]. Mr.

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[20] Campaign rally at Chankele Sokoni, 28/09/2010.
[21] Interview, Kigoma Town, 2/10/2010.
[22] The Chagga is an economically dominant tribe in northern Tanzania. One of the founders of CHADEMA, Mr. Edward Mtei was a prominent Chagga and former

Kabwe never responded or commented on such remarks throughout the campaign.

4.3   *Fighting Election Fraud*

Election fraud has always characterised many elections in African countries including Tanzania. Up to the year 2010, the most alleged fraudulent activities in Tanzania were ballot box stuffing, vote buying/bribery, and manipulating tabulation of results. Others were ghost polling centres. Following increased illegal use of money in elections, the Election Expenses Act was enacted in 2010. The Act brought into the electoral process more players including the Registrar of Political Parties, Prevention and Combating of Corruption Bureau (PCCB) and the Police Force in monitoring the conduct of political parties and candidates. Although Tanzania has institutional mechanisms to prevent election fraud including, for instance, allowing candidates to have polling/tallying agents, the extent to which such mechanisms are implemented during elections is debatable. Therefore, usually, political parties and candidates take extra steps to prevent fraud and rigging of elections. In the 2010 elections in Kigoma North, the conducts of the anti-corruption body (PCCB) and the Police Force did not satisfy many candidates. The APPT-Maendeleo, CHAUSTA and CHADEMA candidates reported that although the anti-corruption body was notified repeatedly about Mr. Nkwarulo's involvement in prohibited acts, it did not take action. Likewise, CCM and CUF candidates blamed the police force for laxity in dealing with violent acts of CHADEMA's vigilant youth. Negligence by the state apparatus resulted in some parties resorting to private policing, something that nearly breached the peace.

Mr. Kabwe's strategies to fight election fraud were in three levels: during the campaign; pre-voting and voting day and then, vote-counting & tallying sessions. The most common fraud activity during the campaign and pre-voting day was vote-buying. Vote-buying occurs when the candidate distributes gifts or cash to the voters to persuade for votes. It can also take

Governor of Tanzania Central Bank. CHADEMA has been labeled by some CCM members as a Chagga party.

the form of temporary buying of voter IDs of the fans of the opponent so that they don't turn up for election. The financial muscles of the powerful three candidates did not only serve morally and legally acceptable purposes but also furthered prohibited conducts. Allegations of vote-buying or attempt vote-buying featured rampantly. Though two of the three candidates successfully kept their illegal expenditures behind closed doors, the CUF candidate had publicly declared himself an M-PESA, and a never broke ATM machine[23]. "*Nipe Nikupe*" (Give and take) was his famous policy as he usually proclaimed at campaign rallies. One example is quoted below:

> My policy is, give and take, I provide to you, and you give [your vote] to me. We are talking about putting our interest first and party interest later. On the voting day, my people should eat first before queuing for voting [....] Let me tell you, there is nothing powerful in this world than money [...]. I need to know how many people will vote for me so that they can be the first beneficiary. If you are among them, please register your name there to Hon. Nkayamba[24].

Two techniques were used by Mr. Kabwe to fight vote buying and one of those was vigilant policing. CHADEMA District Secretary said that after realising that PCCB was doing nothing to prevent bribery, they chose to organise night patrols[25]. The CUF camp alleged that it was CHADEMA's vigilant group that, on 23rd October 2010, raided the CUF's District Secretary's residence in Mwandiga beating him up on allegations of distributing salts and soaps to the voters[26]. Destruction of Mr. Nkwarulo's vehicle at Kamkozi in Kagongo village a day before the election was also attributed to this group. On voting day, the author witnessed one of Mr. Kabwe's vehicles escorting Mr. Nkwarulo by following him at a close distance whenever he went. Nearly the two groups broke into violence. Similarly, on the voting day at Kidahwe village, persons identified as

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[23] M-PESA was an emerging electronic money system operated by one of mobile telephone operators in Tanzania, ATM is an atomized bank machine used to process payments to bank customers.

[24] Campaign rally at Msimba Sokoni, 18/10/2010.

[25] Interview at Kiziba Village, 22/10/2010.

[26] Interview, CUF Secretary at Mwananchi Secondary School, 26/10/2010

Mr. Kabwe's guards did arrest and detain, in their vehicle, the CUF's guy by the name Zakaria Kennedy on allegations of giving bribes to the voters. He was released after Mr. Nkwarulo threatened them with a gun. Mr. Kabwe had also put informers on every corner to report on suspicious acts, and his security team was immediately there to make threats. The second technique that Mr. Kabwe used to fight bribery was to encourage the voters to take bribes from CUF and CCM candidates without surrendering their voter IDs and then punish the bribers in the ballot box. As campaigns were closing to the end, Mr. Lembo had almost gone broke financially that he did not have much to offer as a bribe[27].

Ensuring the security of the vote-counting exercise was mainly done through polling agents but with certain innovations. Each participating candidate/party was allowed to have a polling agent at the polling centre. However, only five parties, namely CCM, CHADEMA, CUF, CHAUSTA and APPT-Maendeleo, had agents in all polling stations. Mr. Kabwe had revealed during an interview with the author that he was planning to have three different polling agents in each constituency. He accomplished this by sponsoring his supporters to serve as polling agents for CHAUSTA and APPT-Maendeleo. These worked jointly as one team. In the case of contesting the validity of votes, they all supported each other. Another technique was to mobilise the voters to stay at the polling station after voting. Mr. Kabwe had told his supporters, during the campaigns that they should stay at the polling centres after voting to make sure no rigging took place. Small groups of people were seen gathering nearby voting centres almost throughout the entire voting period but soon after closing the voting exercise at 4.00 pm, voters started to gather at polling centres pretending that they wanted to know the results. They stayed at a distance of about 30-50 meters away from the polling station. According to the reports of the 78 Poll Watchers, the voting, counting and announcement of results were conducted peacefully and no negative incidences were reported except one case in Kidahwe, where the Poll Watcher reported incidences of bribing the voters. Poll Watchers' reports corroborated with the views of the polling agents whom the author interviewed during polling visits.

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[27] In an interview with the Author, five days before the election, Mr. Lembo was very frustrated and dissatisfied with the level of support from his political party.

P. Pastory

After the votes were counted, election results were recorded in designated form and signed. The polling agents of CHADEMA, CHAUSTA and APPT-Maendeleo handled the copies of result forms to another person immediately after they got outside the polling station. The results were then communicated quickly by calling Mr. Kabwe's tallying centre. The copies of the result forms were then handed over to someone who had been tasked to collect all the forms in a particular village. Such a person moved with a motorcycle from one polling station to another and was accompanied by guards. In some instances, Mr. Kabwe's supporters escorted the vehicles carrying ballot boxes from polling stations to ward headquarters and from ward headquarters to the district tallying centre. They believed that way they prevented any attempt to tamper with the votes during transit.

To prevent the manipulation of tables of results, Mr. Kabwe's team conducted advance tabulation using the same format that was used by the RO to compile the results. The table contained a list of wards, the names of polling stations in each ward, figures of registered voters, total votes, valid votes and votes of each candidate in a particular polling station. The tallying of results at the district tallying centre began on 1st November 2010, the next day after the election. Present persons in the tallying room were the RO, five district-level AROs and the TEMCO Observer. Participating political parties were also present, represented by two persons, including the candidate and or political party tallying agent(s). Unlike in the previous elections, the compilation and tallying of 2010 election results were done by using computer software and the tables were displayed using a projector. Once the entry of results of all polling stations in one ward was completed and summed up, they were displayed to allow candidates/party agents to verify the results before proceeding to next step. In case of mismatch, Mr. Kabwe and candidates of CHAUSTA and APPT- Maendeleo intervened by demanding rectification of the errors. Since Mr. Kabwe had already compiled the results on his laptop, could easily compare the tables with those of the RO and identify a polling station whose results did not match[28].

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[28] In case of contesting the tallying the APPT-Maendeleo candidate and Mr. Kabwe referred to the copies of result forms to verify the Original copy of the RO. It was also noted that the candidate of CHAUSTA did not have copies of election result forms in

In addition, as the tallying process was still ongoing, a crowd of Mr. Kabwe's supporters gathered a few metres outside the tallying centred. These were shouting at intervals claiming that they already knew who the winner was. One of the voices that repeatedly came from that crowd stated that *"We know we have won by about 5,000 votes, we are here simply to wait for a formal announcement of the winner. You will see what we will do here if another person other than Zitto is announced as a winner!*[29] It was learnt later that the crowd had been mobilised by Mr. Kabwe's team to put pressure on the RO and the security organs by threatening to cause chaos in case their candidate wasn't declared as a winner of the election.

5   Reflections from the 2015 and 2020 Elections

The 2015 general election was competitive ever in Tanzania. It was in this election the percentage of opposition's elected seats to the parliament increased to 31.06% while its parliamentary vote share rose to 44.96 percent comparing to 38.9 and 26 percent in the 2010 and 2005 elections respectively. Notwithstanding, the political playing field between the opposition and the ruling party was not equal. Kigoma Urban constituency was no exception. The TEMCO's election observer reported that the election was free but not fair *"because there was not equal ground of competition (since) the ruling party was privileged over the opposition parties"* (Simba, 2015*)*. Yet, not only did the opposition candidate win that parliamentary election, but also CCM got 5 of the 19 seats in councillors' elections. Mr. Kabwe deployed similar tactics that were used in 2010 to get elected and secure the ballots.

In the 2020 general elections, the ruling party was officially declared a winner in landslide victory throughout the country not only in Presidential elections but also in the Parliamentary and Councillors' elections. The percentage of elected opposition seats in the parliament dropped from 31 to 3 percent. Mr. Kabwe lost the seat to CCM's candidate after getting 20,600 votes

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the tallying room. Since these were collected by Mr. Kabwe's team they were probably reserved as backup copy, in case they were to contest the results in a court. [29]Gathering crowd *(Voice from the crowd gathering at Kigoma District Council headquarters on 1/11/2010).*

compared to 27,688 of Mr. Kilumbe Shabi Ng'enda of CCM. Similarly, the opposition managed to get only 1 out of 19 councillors' seats. Reacting to the results on 29th October 2021 (at 18.40 Hours EAT), Mr. Kabwe tweeted through his official (verified) Twitter page:

> The Returning Officer for Kigoma Urban has announced the results as you can see here [attachment]. These results are fabricated. They were written by the Kigoma District Security Officer. NO SPOILT VOTES SHOWN! The fact is that I got 32,906 and CCM got 27,688 votes. Those 20,600 votes they claim to be mine are not but forged [30] (Unofficial translation).

On the same date some hours earlier (at 13:51 Hours-EAT), he had tweeted claiming to have won the election by 5,218 votes. He also contended that the electoral commission was determined not to announce his victory. These claims by Mr. Kabwe were not independently verified. He also added that he will follow "what the citizens of Kigoma will decide to do". This is the same technique Mr. Kabwe had used in previous elections to put pressure on electoral organs to announce the results. This time it did not work out and the quotation below, from the TEMCO constituency observer's report, probably explains why:

> There was a delay in receiving results from 88 polling stations which led to the gathering of a huge crowd at the Municipal Office to await the declaration of results for the parliamentary seat. Security was tightened around the area as more people continued to convene outside the Municipal Office and began chanting and singing party songs. Police with heavy armour surrounded the area... The results were finally announced at 5 pm, one hour after the order of the Regional Police Commander... The police opted to disperse the crowds by releasing tear gas and approximately nine tear gas bombs were released resulting in panic across the municipality. There were no injuries that were reported (Musokwa, 2020: 31-32).

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[30] https://twitter.com/zittokabwe/status/1321839322941870080?lang=en

Unlike in the 2010 and 2015 elections, in 2020, it was not only the supporters of Mr. Kabwe who had gathered at the district tallying centre. According to the TEMCO Observer, CCM fans who gathered at the district tallying centre outnumbered those of ACT-Wazalendo. Both sides were chanting party songs. Mr. Kabwe did not show up at the tallying centre probably in anticipation of the outcome. While the opposition's tactics to fight electoral fraud were successful in previous elections, they were not in the 2020 general elections. Commentators on the 2020 elections in Tanzania had it that CCM's landslide victory was backed by coercion (Cheeseman *et al.* 2021). According to Dan Paget, in the 2020 elections, the regime did not simply "tilt the playing field; it closed the field and locked the gate". The menu of rigging tactics expanded ranging from blocking opposition candidates from submitting nomination forms, to disqualification of opposition aspirants, ballot box stuffing, violence, intimidation, and denying accreditation of opposition polling agents (Paget, 2021). Similarly, a TEMCO observer in Kigoma Urban Constituency reported that the election was marked by harassment and arrest of opposition members (Musokwa, 2020). Probably this might have rendered the opposition's scare tactics redundant.

The 2020 general election was conducted in a stringent political environment. Earlier in 2015 and 2016, the government passed laws i.e. The Cybercrimes Act (2015), the Statistics Act (2015), Access to Information Act (2016), and Media services Act (2016) putting restrictions on freedom of expression. According to the *Mwananchi News Paper of 7th January 2018*, in early January 2018, the Tanzania Communication Regulatory Authority imposed penalties on five major media houses in Tanzania, ITV, Star TV, AZAM TV, Channel Ten and EATV for covering election-related events on what was termed, by the regulatory body, as violation of content ethics including covering a story of one of the by-election observers, the Legal and Human Rights Centre (LHRC).[31] Consequently in the 2020 elections, the media refrained from reporting issues that would cause troubles on its side.

Towards the 2020 elections, there were some reforms in the electoral institutions that reduced opposition opportunities to monitor the voting and vote counting exercises. One pertains to the accreditation of polling agents.

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[31]https://www.mwananchi.co.tz/mw/habari/makala/siasa/faini-kubwa-zinaviumiza-vyombo-vya-habari-2883916

Unlike in the previous elections where, at least a day before the election, the polling agent was issued with the copy of Oath of Secrecy that served as an identification for admission into the polling station, the 2020 election regulations entrusted the duty of introducing the polling agents to the RO[32]. Under the new regulations, the RO assembles polling agents' accreditation document(s) and handles them to the Presiding Officer who uses it to identify and admit into the station, a respective polling agent. The opposition complained that a number of its polling agents were delayed or denied entry into the polling centres because Presiding Officers had not received polling agents' identification documents from ROs (also see Paget, 2021). Delaying entry of polling agents opens room for stuffing ballot boxes with fake votes. Second, the 2020 election regulations made the issuance of copies of results to the polling agents' non-mandatory. Presiding Officers may choose not to issue the copies without breaking the law. In absence of copies of election result forms, parallel tabulation and the verification of election results is not possible. It also implies absence of evidence if election results are to be contested in the courts of law. Reforms of electoral institutions have also criminalised political party's security groups[33]. This implies that the opposition's strategy of mobilising vigilant youth to deal with election fraud is now obsolete.

Although strategies used to prevent election fraud were successful in 2010 and 2015 elections, they are costly and require careful planning. A successful collaborative poll watching by opposition political parties has to be planned in advance and carefully coordinated otherwise the leaders/candidates of some parties may frustrate the process at the critical stage. Leaders/candidates of small parties in Tanzania are vulnerable to co-optation by the ruling party. Also sometimes, polling agents require some sort of facilitation. It may therefore be difficult to afford more polling agents in a single polling station especially when the candidate has no strong grassroots' party network. Advance tabulation of results has been simplified with technological developments including improved mobile communication

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[32] The National Elections (Presidential and Parliamentary Elections) Regulations, 2020. GN No.402 of 5 May 2020. Also see GN No. 401 for local authorities elections.
[33] See Section "8E *The Political Parties (Amendment) Act* 2019" of the United Republic of Tanzania.

networks. This might facilitate communication of results to the tallying centres. However, emerging digital authoritarianism during elections in Africa including shutting or slowing down internets and text messaging is likely to paralyse such initiatives. Similarly, the opposition's tallying centres face a risk of police raids. For instance, after the election on October 26, 2015, *Reuters* reported about the police raid of the opposition tallying centre and arresting party members[34]. A similar incident was reported by *The Citizen News Paper* on Friday, October 30, 2015. In that particular case the police raided the election observer's office, the Tanzanian Civil Society Consortium on Election Observation (TACCEO), seized 24 computers and arrested staff suspecting it of collecting, tallying and distributing election results to the public[35]. Moreover, the opposition's strategy of making threats by threatening to mobilise the voters into riots depends on the willingness of the citizens to bear the risk. While this strategy used to work in the past, it is unlikely under current circumstances. State security organs have become more intolerant of opposition's protests and are prepared to crush riots at any cost. For instance, despite rampant allegations of election fraud in 2020 and repeated opposition's call for the people to flock the streets with demonstrations, no incidents of riots happened. Police threats and heavy security presence and street patrols during and after elections explain why riots are very unlikely.

6   Conclusion

The political neutrality and competence of EMBs are of critical importance in delivering credible free and fair election outcomes. In Tanzania, elections are conducted in an environment where the integrity of the EMB is highly questionable. Also, elections are not yet free of corrupt practices of voter bribery, especially between competing candidates. Unpopular candidates with strong financial muscles are likely to get elected by buying votes or buying voter turnout. As a result, winning elections in Tanzania is not only the

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[34]https://www.reuters.com/article/us-tanzania-election-police-idUSKCN0SJ0WU20151025
[35]   https://www.thecitizen.co.tz/news/Police-raid-observers--office--arrest-staff/1840340-2935620-4v0takz/index.html

question of effective campaigning or having a good candidate but also of countering election fraud. This study has revealed how the opposition candidate, Mr. Kabwe had been organising to win elections. It has also revealed how he used voter education, vigilant policing, collaborative poll monitoring with minor parties, and advance tabulation of results and threat of violence to fight election fraud. Such strategies are however very costly not only financially but also in terms of time, organisation and coordination. While these traditional strategies worked perfectly well in 2010 and 2015, they did not in the 2020 election. Changes in the country's political landscape especially after the 2015 elections have not only increased the cost of ensuring the security of ballots on the opposition's side but also have made it almost impossible. Traditional methods of fighting election fraud and securing ballots may not be useful under this new political context. The negative side of it is that the current electoral context increases mistrust and suspicion while eroding the possibility of the losing side accepting defeat. At worst, this is likely to breed into election violence in the future. Much as Tanzania is a backsliding democracy, sustained pressure for democratic reforms may reverse the situation.

This case study has focused on the security of ballots in election campaigns, voting, vote counting and tallying stages of an election cycle. Massive disqualification of opposition candidates during the nomination stages in the 2020 general elections in Tanzania raises interest for future research. Further studies may explore the techniques that were used to knock out opposition candidates during the early stages of the nomination process.

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