



Fundamentals for Power-sharing Institutionalisation in Divided Societies: A Systematic Review

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Abstract

Power-sharing arrangements have become one of the most valuable alternatives in solving political and ethnic-related conflicts in recent decades. This is mainly due to the inclusion of contesting groups in political governance, thus helping society avoid violence caused by harsh power struggles. Despite the conflict management potential, many power-sharing arrangements in heterogeneous and deeply divided societies fail to mature and transform into permanent institution. This article applies a systematic review of the literature on political institutionalism to establish the fundamentals for power-sharing institutionalisation. Its analysis reveals that power-sharing institutionalisation relies on multiple factors, including but not limited to political will, effective institutions, socio-cultural support, and support from the international community. The article contributes to existing research on political institutionalism by proposing the parameters for examining power-sharing institutionalisation across societies.

Keywords

Power-sharing, Institutionalisation, Divided Society, Political System, Political Conflict, Ethnic Conflict

1. Introduction

Over the last few decades, power-sharing has become a prominent approach to restoring peace in deeply divided and plural societies (Lijphart, 2007; Loizides, 2018). Many literature underscore the significance of power-sharing in realising that objective. First, it gives all contesting parties access to power. Second, it provides legitimacy to the incumbent government and offers avenues for all politically significant groups to participate in decision-making; lastly, it prevents elites from starting crises as they are assured of their power (Cheeseman & Tendi, 2010; Hartzell & Mehler, 2019). In particular, settling diversity, which results in political conflict, seems to be the most crucial cause of adopting power-sharing. This explains why many countries, prone to electoral strife or civil war, adopt power-sharing. For instance, the survey of Strøm et al., (2017) reveals that over two hundred power-sharing arrangements resulted from societal diversities caused by political crises. The survey also discovered that negotiated political settlements that did not result in power-sharing did not last long. Because of this, most scholars view power-sharing as a means of political settlement in plural and conflictual societies (Lijphart, 1969; Shivji, 2009). By enabling inclusion of the politically significant societal groups, power-sharing serves the essential function of promoting peace (Sambanis, 2020).

Usually, power-sharing involves sharing power between two or more groups. The specific arrangement is set to ensure each group gets a stake separately or joins to share. Lijphart (1968) mentions four scenarios where conflictual parties can share power. They include a grand coalition where the parties share power by dividing the posts among all parties in the national unity government; proportional representation involving the sharing of power between parties according to seats and a vote cast by each party proportionally; segment autonomy encompassing the dividing of the sharing segment to the parties without interference to each other. Lastly is the Veto Vote, whereby each party has an equal veto in the decision-making entities (Denker, 2015; Lijphart, 1969). Certain power-sharing arrangements may combine two or more of the above forms. Such cases include Northern Ireland, the Netherlands, Lebanon, Bosnia and Herzegovina, South Africa, Kenya, Zimbabwe, Switzerland, Malaysia, Iraq, and Zanzibar, a semi-autonomous government in the United Republic of Tanzania. Political power-sharing generally implies the guaranteed inclusion of rebel representatives or affiliated social groups in central decision-making processes (Binningsbø, 2013). It reflects the features of consociationalism, specifically the aspects of a grand coalition and proportional representation (Johnson, 2023; Wolf, 2018).

The previous research on power-sharing denotes its importance in many societies as it reduces the enmity between two contested parties. Some scholars denote that the power-sharing approach is inevitable in African ethnic and Asian multi-sectoral conflicts (Lijphart, 2012). Sometimes, power-sharing serves as a transition mechanism as it helps to establish a negative peace to stop the current hostilities and build institutions (Hartzell & Hoddie, 2003; McCulloch & McEvoy, 2018). Other scholars argue that, due to power-sharing's imposed merits, it may be relevant to adopt power-sharing as a permanent mode of governance in society to prevent conflicts from recurring and enhance peace and democracy. Countries like Switzerland, Lebanon, Malaysia, and Zanzibar (Tanzania) are among those that benefit from permanent power-sharing.

Despite multiple initiatives to adopt power-sharing in many countries, its implementation has never been smooth. Many divided and pluralistic societies have encountered notable power-sharing failures (Kotze, 2017). Several factors engineer the failure of a plethora of power-sharing. For example, on multiple occasions, the power-sharing attempts appear to be weak and not institutionalised (Sriram & Zahar, 2009). Yet, the effects of institutionalisation on power-sharing cannot be discerned clearly without examining the antecedents of institutionalisation. This article considers inadequate institutionalisation the main factor behind the failure of the power-sharing arrangements. It argues that to understand the failure or success of power-sharing, one should examine the level of the institutionalisation process. The analysis reveals that power-sharing is institutionalised when it is grounded in formal arrangements within laws, constitutions, or agreements that distribute power among rival groups. Nevertheless, the success of institutionalization relies on multiple factors, including political will, effective institutions, socio-cultural support, and support from the international community.

The rest of the article is structured in five parts. The next sets the analytical framework, building the base for understanding institutionalisation and power-sharing. Then, the article methodology is presented subsequently. Discussion of results is covered in the fourth and fifth parts. The former locates power-sharing within the political institutionalism research figuring out how the institutionalisation process of other political institutions, apart from power-sharing, works. The fifth part is a synthesis of theoretical and empirical works on institutionalism proposing fundamental foundations of power-sharing institutionalisation. The

article concludes by summarising the basic parameters for power-sharing institutionalisation while pinpointing areas for future research.

2. Analytical Framework

Theoretically, power-sharing is a consensus-based governance system that involves two or more contending groups working together to run the country. Analytically, it can be conceived as a political arrangement, a governance structure, an institution or a system. The institutionalization of power-sharing can be well understood from institutional theory. Since there are many variants within institutionalism, this study approaches power-sharing from the political institutionalism perspective. From old to new, institutional theorists have attempted to explain why institutions are formed, and why they grow, fail or endure. Similarly, from the literature covered, it was noticed that various academic studies on the stability of political systems or the growth of political organizations base their arguments on institutional theory (Amenta & Ramsey, 2010; Lincoln, 1995).

Scholars have conceptualised institutionalisation from various dimensions. In politics, institutionalization has been used widely to show how an organization, a system, and procedures gain stability and value (Huntington, 1968). To be stable means to live longer with assigned tasks and to achieve value means to be accepted by society. Similarly, some academics use institutional theory to understand the stability and growth of a political system (Diermeier, 2015; Dix, 1992); party institutionalization (Kuenzi & Lambright, 2001; Randall & Svåsand, 2002), legislature institutionalization (Judge, 2003; Polsby, 1968), communist and dictatorship regimes (Enyedi & Bértoa, 2018; Meng, 2020), and many others. As Huntington once put it, “Only by understanding institutionalization will we be able to bolster or disapprove hypotheses about the relationship between social, economic, and demographic changes on the one hand and variations in political structure on the other” (Huntington, 1968: 405).

Institutional theory underscores the processes involved in institutionalising any system since the early stages of system formation. As the system develops, it will probably face emerging challenges until it develops the ability to function autonomously. It also underscores the fact that institutionalisation is a non-linear process and is dependent on the economic, socio-cultural and political conditions present in society. Applying institutional theory to power-sharing can therefore serve to establish the foundations under which the stability and value of power-sharing arrangements rests.

3. Methodology

This article adopted a systematic review approach examining a plethora of studies on institutionalization and power-sharing. The author started by reviewing the constitutions of purposely selected ten (10) countries that temporarily or permanently adopted power-sharing. These include the power-sharing in Lebanon, Kenya, Zimbabwe, Zanzibar, Malaysia, Switzerland, Netherlands, Cyprus, Belgium, and South Sudan. In the second phase, the author systematically reviewed academic articles retrieved from five purposely selected repositories: Google Scholar (Gs), Jstor (Js), ProQuest Political Science (Pps), PAIS Index (Pi), and Policy File Index (Pfi). The articles from the identified repositories were manually searched using contextualized search strings created from the keywords and synonyms in Table 11. Sixty-one works were reviewed to provide the necessary data for the power-sharing institutionalisation parameters.

Table 1: keywords and synonyms

Keyword	Synonyms
Power-sharing	Political power-sharing, GNU, Government of National Unity, Consociation.
Institutionalisation	Institutionalism, Arrangement, regulation, laws, standardisation, uniformity, constitutions

Inclusion/exclusion criteria of the reviewed works considered only those peer-reviewed, written in English, and published by reputable outlets between 1968 and November 2023. According to Murtagh (2011), power-sharing was incepted immediately after the end of the Cold War in 1989. Even though, the literature on institutionalisation was published in the 1960s, e.g. Huntington's "*Political Order in Changing Society*" in 1968. This is why this review covers from 1968 to 2024. A systematic literature review (SLR) triangulated Kitchenham and Charters (2007) guidelines. The initial article search was completed in July 2023 and repeated in November 2024. The consensus among authors grounded the decision on what articles to include in the study. The process of filtering articles comprised three steps: preliminary, intermediate, and final. At the preliminary stage, all articles encountered during the initial search were included. In the intermediate, articles were filtered based on title, abstract, and keywords. In the final phase, the author chose the articles to include after reading all the articles selected in the intermediate phase. The article selection process is shown in Table 2. A total of sixty-one (61) articles were reviewed to provide the basis for the results and discussion of basic parameters for the institutionalisation of power-sharing.

Table 2: Searching Result

Search engine	Result	Valid articles	Selected/Reviewed
Google Scholar	14800	401	34
Jstor	1885	97	13
ProQuest Political Science	33	9	7
PAIS Index	12	6	3
Policy File Index	46	18	4
Total (reviewed)			61

4. Political Institutionalisation

Several scholarly works have established the basis for understanding political institutionalisation, including the institutionalisation of political systems, organisations, and other arrangements. These studies include the works of Scott (2004), DiMaggio & Powell (1983), and Huntington (1968). Similarly, there has been much interest in researching the institutionalisation of political institutions. Nevertheless, the majority of the works on political institutionalism including Basedau & Stroh (2011); Enyedi & Bétoa (2018); Lindberg (2007); Mainwaring, et al., (2018); Meng (2020); Randall & Svåsand (2002); Sanches (2014, 2018); and Whitehead (2000) have concentrated on the institutionalisation of political parties or, authoritarian regimes (Burkhardt, 2021; Dix, 1992); Little has been done to explore the conditions under which political power-sharing become institutionalised. Institutionalisation of power-sharing may not undergo the same path as party institutionalisation or

institutionalisation of other political regimes. Nonetheless, this body of research offers some insights into understanding power-sharing institutionalisation.

Samuel P. Huntington's work, "*Political Order in Changing Society*" offers four fundamental features for determining the stability and growth of a political system. These are autonomy, complexity, adaptation, and coherence. Multiple scholars, including Polsby (1968a), Meng (2020), and Judge (2003) have adopted these parameters in evaluating political institutions encompassing states, legislatures, regimes, or political parties. In line with Huntington (1968), many studies agree that institutionalisation occurs as the system grows by gaining its attitude and strengthening its structure or, as it performs its given functions at a higher level (Levitsky & Murillo, 2009; Dix, 1992). Similarly, in describing the institutionalisation of a legislative branch, Copeland & Patterson (1994) used four attributes: formality, uniformity, complexity, and autonomy. Others such as, Leston-Bandeira & Norton (2005) restrict the essential conditions for the institutionalisation of legislature to regularity and structural issues.

Studies on party institutionalisation use different terminologies but suggest more of the same foundations. For instance, Randall & Svåsand (2002) refer to attitudinal and structural dimensions while Basedau & Stroh (2011) adopts Huntington's "stability" and "value-infusion." Each of these studies identifies four parameters of institutionalisation as shown in Table 3.

Table 3: The Parameters of Party Institutionalisation

	Attitudinal	Structure	
Internal Order	Value Infusion	Organisation Strength	(Randall & Svåsand, 2002)
External Order	Reification	Party Autonomy	
	Stability	Value-infusion	
Internal	Level of organisation	Coherent	(Basedau & Stroh (2011)
External	Root in the Society	Autonomy	

For instance, in evaluating party institutionalisation Whitehead (2000) shows that the degree of institutionalisation of opposition parties varies depending on how strong the *bond is between leaders and members*. This was dubbed *cohesiveness* in a political organisation by Huntington (1968). Basedau and Stroh (2011) refer to it as having *foundations or roots in society*. Researches show that political parties that enjoy a positive reputation among voters are more likely to function as institutions than those that do not (Randall & Svåsand, 2002). Parties representing common causes, unity, and vitality are more likely to be strategically viable than those representing corruption, stagnation, and divisiveness (ibid.). As Randall & Svasand (2002) put it, "the more the degree of voter loyalty and the more the party members and supporters identify with the party as an expressive phenomenon, the more institutionalised [the party] is" (p. 9).

Although studies on political institutionalism suggest important factors for institutionalisation, they underplay a leadership factor. In this regard, Meng (2020) underlines that an organisation without a leadership tool lacks institutionalisation and autonomy. This also corroborates with Levitsky (2014) and Levitsky & Murillo (2009), who contend that institutional strength must be assessed with stability and enforcement (strong leadership). For instance,

the impact of institutional strength on dictatorial governments is significant. However, regimes that are institutionalised can continue to operate even with a change in leadership.

5. Institutionalisation of Power-Sharing

Power-sharing, unlike other political arrangements, systems or structures is essentially rooted in conflict resolution. The conflict's nature and complexity decide the conflict resolution or power-sharing model to adopt. The choice of the resolution model may also depend on the nature and the environment of the segments of society (Lijphart, 2019). However, in all conflicts, a society with groups of the same power can share or separate power among themselves. For example, ethnic conflict between two tribes differs from that of multi-ethnicity. Nevertheless, a conflict caused by power-sharing is different from a civil war. In the civil war problem, the sharing not only rests on sharing political posts but must go deeper into economic, military, and other social matters to address the perceived relative deprivation and perceived injustices. In Malaysia, for example, due to the diversity of races and religions, comprising Malay origin, Chinese, and Indian social segments, power-sharing was structured to have three main political parties of the United Malay National Organisation (UMNO), Malaysian Chinese Association (MCA) and Malaysian Indian Congress (Denker, 2015).

Besides, power-sharing is governed largely by the willingness of the actors rather than the rules and regulations. Studies related to power-sharing suggest that the survival, stability, and growth of power-sharing depend on the willingness of the leaders to make a consensual decision. Its institutionalisation relies on the process and the actors' character and behaviour (Bormann et al., 2014). Therefore, for it to survive it has to develop a sense of decision consensus.

Other studies mention support by the international community as a significant factor in sustaining power-sharing. Sambanis (2020) states that power-sharing can persist more with the intervention of the United Nations (U.N.) and its agencies than with local enforcement. Similarly, Nomikos (2020) has shown that the U.N.'s intervention in power-sharing is more successful than local intervention, with about 20% to 40 % success. Nevertheless, a sustainable power-sharing arrangement must be able to function without or with little external enforcement.

Studies also emphasise the importance of formal arrangements in sustaining power-sharing. This is because power-sharing initiatives operating without formal arrangements jeopardize their outcomes. However, there is always a challenge in designing optimal arrangements. Some studies suggest that there is an excellent chance for power-sharing to be built upon inclusive arrangements that are less autonomous to sustain it and promote peace (Strøm et al., 2017; Vergunst, 2004). A strong and sustainable power-sharing must allow diversified groups to build trust and consensus and work together. Thus, it must give autonomy to the participating groups (Sambanis & Schulhofer-Wohl, 2019). The Bosnia-Herzegovina power-sharing demonstrates these characteristics. It was structured by including three presidential members, one from each ethnic group. Those presidential leaders can veto any policy hindering their ethnic interest (Charter & Srpska, 1996). The local and regional authorities were also shared to ensure that no single group controlled the resources and power of decision-making, and they were even given the chance to participate in foreign activities (McMahon & Western, 2009). Generally, the Bosnia-Herzegovina power-sharing adopted the elements of the Lijphart Consociation, demonstrating a clear picture of how power-sharing can be structured to include all contested parties but with some autonomy. The autonomy in inclusion is essential when society has major and minor group segments, unlike

when the society has many groups of the same size and power. Several other studies, such as McGarry & O'Leary (2017) and McGarry (2008) suggest an alternative approach to sustaining power-sharing.

5.1. Fundamentals for Power-sharing Institutionalisation

The foregoing analysis shows that power-sharing institutionalisation is a complex endeavours that should be studied based on the context and origin of the problem. Huntington (1968) describes institutionalisation as the process by which the political system grows and gains value. Value is the political organisation's innate sense and cohesive nature, whereas stability is its power and reach. Thus, the power-sharing institutionalisation level mainly depends on the arrangement processes. For example, adoption, calibration, and routinization (Orji, 2014). Huntington (1968) regards institutionalisation as the determinant outcome of any political change. On that base, the growth and stability of power-sharing depends on the method developed in the early stages of its operation. When institutionalised, power-sharing will probably face emerging challenges and develop the ability to function autonomously as other political institutions do (Judge, 2003; Polsby, 1968).

Institutionalising power-sharing is non-linear, independent of the economic and social realms and modern politics. However, like other political arrangements, systems, or structures, the power-sharing stability depends on the level of institutionalisation measured in terms of adoption, adaptation, routinisation, and social practices (Sanchez, 2014). Like other social systems, power-sharing is institutionalised when it acquires value and develops stability. This is to say that power-sharing is institutionalised as long as it creates stability in the system and develops a sense of consensus. However, the stability of the systems and consensus may be apparent when formal arrangements are recognised in laws, rules, and regulations (Lijphart, 2008).

The institutionalisation of power-sharing is grounded in multiple foundations. After examining the available literature, this article has identified five significant foundations of power-sharing summarised in Table 4. A detailed discussion of each foundation follows. Firstly, the power-sharing institutionalisation must create cohesion among the members. Cohesion means a shared understanding and consistent connection among the members in a certain unity of work (Huddy, 2015). A political organisation or system needs internal bonds and unity to solve emerging problems (Huntington, 1968). An effective organisation requires, at a minimum, a consensus on the functional boundaries of the group and the procedures for resolving disputes that arise within those boundaries. The more political organisation or arrangement is covered and bound internally, the more it is institutionalised (Dix, 1992). Cohesion is understood through unity, consensus, and boundness. Consensus is the heart of power-sharing, which the elite ought to use in all decisions. The system can solve the problem and reach a decision. Unity is the feeling of togetherness. The sense of belonging. The more members feel they own the system, the more they can defend it. This increases system stability and endurance and is hence institutionalised. When two or more parties with different interests work together, misunderstanding will probably occur.

In this regard, for power-sharing to be institutionalised, there must be a way to solve the internal problem and unite the parties. This can be done through rules, regulations, and committees that oversee the negotiation. In most cases, power-sharing collapses, and contending parties revert to previous conflicts when the system fails to resolve emerging conflicts. The Case of Switzerland shows exactly the cohesion among the sharing groups. In Switzerland, all groups agreed and were willing to share power, from the group's top leaders to the local citizens. Each group was willing to lose some of its power so the power-sharing

would continue. This practice contradicts what has happened in Southern Sudan. Power-sharing often fails when contesting groups are unwilling to lose some of their power for the benefit of their GNU. Nevertheless, power-sharing may fail when there are no plans to control emerging misunderstandings. Thus, the power-sharing with strong rules and flexibility to change survives longer than the other. Malaysia is an example of the importance of cohesion and consensus on power-sharing stability and growth.

Table 4: Proposed Fundamentals for Power-sharing Institutionalisation

Foundations	Parameters for Measurements
Power-sharing adaptability	Respond to the challenges that emerge.
	Chronological (age longevity)
	Generational age (regime shift)
	Functional longevity
Power-sharing Coherence	Other functions apart from assigned tasks (i.e., economics)
	Unity, Esprit, Morale, and Discipline
	Function according to the constitution and other rules
Power-sharing Autonomy	Command and Discipline
	The wholeness of the system
	Not influenced by outsiders
Power-sharing to be Rooted in the Society	Not expressing the interest of a particular group.
	Mass involvement in the implementation of power-sharing
	The tie between the elites and the masses
	Mass satisfaction with the performance
Power-sharing complexity	Willingness to continue with the system
	Extension to sub-unity and hierarchy
	Multiple functions

Source: Author's construct with insight from the literature.

Secondly, power-sharing institutionalisation implies adaptability. Many scholars emphasise the adaptability of the political system as an essential parameter for institutionalising political systems, arrangements, or organisations. Adaptability is the resilience of an organisation against rigidities. The greater the capacity of the organisation to meet the challenges, the more it is institutionalised. The political system should be firm and adaptable to the changes that arise externally and internally (Huntington, 1968; Judge, 2003; Polsby, 1968). The system's strength to challenges enables the organisation to survive for a long time, unlike when the system is loose. Power-sharing in Africa experiences multiple adaptability issues such as the boycott of elections by one group (Makulilo & Henry, 2017). Boycotting parties or groups assume that the power-sharing will no longer be available when they boycott. A good example is Zanzibar in 2015. The CUF party boycotted the election, preventing them from participating in power-sharing even though power-sharing has been adopted as a permanent constitutional arrangement. Luckily enough, the power-sharing of Zanzibar has a strong foundation on rules

allowing the continuation of power-sharing in any circumstance, including boycotting by one party.

Thirdly, power-sharing institutionalisation must be autonomous. Autonomy is a fundamental foundation for institutionalising power-sharing. A political organisation needs to work autonomously without being interfered with by any power. Dix (1992) and Huntington (1968) observe that a political organisation that is less autonomous can neither be stable nor institutionalised. Stability in power-sharing implies the ability of a power-sharing to function without consideration of personal interest. Otherwise, it may suffer the same weaknesses as authoritarian regimes (Judge, 2003). In this regard, the power-sharing must be independent from the contesting parties. Chigora & Guzura (2011) and Mukuhlani (2014) denote that power-sharing does not reach maturity in most of Africa due to a lack of autonomy. They exemplify the phenomenon in Zimbabwe, where the President can interfere with the functionality of power-sharing agreements. As a result, power-sharing becomes post-sharing, which mostly ends in conflict (Kotze, 2017; Ottmann & Vüllers, 2015). The case may be the same in Zanzibar. Evidence shows that despite the sharing of political power between the two parties, the incumbent leadership has the absolute authority to decide power-sharing matters (Haji, 2023).

Fourth, the system's rootedness in society is another important foundation for power-sharing institutionalisation. This is a stage where the adopted political system operates in multiple community groups and is not confined to a limited region or ethnic groups. Basedau & Stroh (2011) show that the more the political system is owned and supported by the public, the more stable and institutionalised it becomes. Scholars studying party and party system institutionalisation consider this parameter one of the fundamental bases. For instance, borrowing from institutionalisation of party systems, they argue that the political party would not have stability without this foundation. A party system is stable and sustainable with a broader scope, geographical dispersal, and rooting in society (Lindberg, 2007; Mainwaring et al., 2018; Sanches, 2014; Whitehead, 2000). Power-sharing is considered a political system because its base is the political elites who enter into negotiations and increase the involvement of the citizens in power-sharing decisions (Bakari & Makulilo, 2022; Lijphart, 2019). However, the failure of many power-sharing arrangements and practices is often caused by the power-sharing being constructed as an elite project instead of a public one (Kittilson & Schwindt-Bayer, 2010). Therefore, the power-sharing arrangements should be rooted in society to be institutionalised. Switzerland is an excellent example of this condition whereby the citizens can decide what they think is suitable for their power-sharing. Nevertheless, citizens in Zanzibar are the base of power-sharing since all constitutional issues related to changing the structure or eliminating power-sharing must involve the masses through a referendum (Haji, 2023). With this, their power-sharing arrangement is sustained and is expected to live longer than other power-sharing arrangements.

Finally, the complexity of power-sharing is a significant foundation for institutionalising power-sharing. Polsby (1968) and Judge (2003) describe complexity in terms of the autonomy and importance of committees, the growth of specialised agencies of party leadership, and the provision of allowances, accommodation, staff, and backup facilities. The complexity of power-sharing is observed in the ability of its institution to perform hierarchical and multi-task functioning. Huntington (1968) observes, "The greater the number and variety of subunits, the greater the ability of the organisation to secure and maintain the loyalty of its members". The more power-sharing increases the sub-unities performing many tasks, the more stable it is. Power-sharing that is closed to one function or set to a single hierarchy cannot survive long as it cannot be the political system of a particular society. Likewise, Bakari and Makulilo (2022) demonstrates that decentralising power-sharing to lower hierarchical levels is crucial for its

functionalisation. Said & Hikmany (2016) emphasize that power-sharing is institutionalized in the environment, which multiplies sectors for the public good, including the economy, peace, and democracy.

6. Conclusion

The study sets out to establish the foundations necessary for power-sharing institutionalisation. The analysis was based on power sharing's nature, character, and functions, originally based on bringing peace and enhancing democracy. The study denotes that as two or more groups share power, internal and external challenges and obstacles are inevitable and may hinder the institutionalisation of power-sharing government. So, the existence of solid rules and principles will be the only way for the system to be institutionalised. This can be reached if the system is owned by the public and does not depend on individual decisions or external forces. It is denoted by this study that the consensus decision and willingness of the leaders to cooperate is another basic tool for power-sharing to be institutionalised in society. Power-sharing by its nature is consensus governance. So, without equal treatment in decisions among the members, the continuity of the power-sharing might not be possible. This is among the biggest problems faced the power-sharing in Africa including Zimbabwe, Kenya, Zanzibar and South Sudan.

Derived from the above observations, the study concludes that for power-sharing to be institutionalised, it must function autonomously, be well adaptable to the environment, attain complexity, have consensus decisions, and be rooted in society. Even though conflict dynamics can vary and ought to be interrogated in their specific contexts, the basics of stabilising sharing power remain the same. Since this study has established the fundamentals of power-sharing from a systematic literature review, empirical research may test these assumptions across power-sharing arrangements in the world.

Funding

No funding was received for this work.

Disclosure Statement

No potential conflict of interest to disclose.

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M. Haji

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