Despite growing critical engagement with the African Solutions to African Problems (ASAP) doctrine, limited attention has been devoted to examining its philosophical and normative foundations. This article addresses this gap by offering a systematic critical analysis of ASAP, identifying and interrogating its core normative principles and underlying assumptions. Most importantly, the paper distinguishes between the doctrine’s empirical assumptions, descriptive claims regarding the causes of African conflicts, and its normative prescriptions, which dictate how and by whom these conflicts ought to be resolved. Drawing on textual and critical philosophical analysis, the article argues that the ASAP doctrine rests on both flawed normative principles and empirical assumptions about the causes of conflict in Africa and the morally appropriate pathways to resolution. These shortcomings ultimately undermine efforts to achieve just and durable peace outcomes in African conflicts. To empirically illustrate these problems, the article examines the recent Pretoria Peace Accord as a manifestation of conflict resolution guided by the ASAP doctrine. The article contends that the ASAP doctrine should not be celebrated as a guiding principle for conflict resolution on the continent. Instead, it advocates for alternative approaches that better capture the complexity of contemporary African conflicts and embed justice and accountability as essential components in peacebuilding and conflict-resolution efforts.